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Abstract: This paper aims to study the choice of oshoring modes made by multinationals in the
presence of asymmetric information. We focus on two types of asymmetric information, namely
hidden characteristics and hidden action. The former creates adverse selection problem, and the
later leads to moral hazard problem, both of which incur non-trivial costs to multinationals. We
show that dierent oshoring modes, including greeneld foreign direct investment, joint venture,
and outsourcing, can serve as a means to overcome or mitigate the problem of information asym-
metry. We study the conditions under which one particular type of oshore modes dominates the
others. The model generates implications consistent with the patterns of the prevalence of various
oshoring models over time, and across industries and countries.
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One of the most publicized potential disadvantages to oshore production is poor quality con-
trol. Cases in point are re-hazard batteries, lead-paint toys, melamine-laced pet food crisis and
melamine-tainted milk incidence uncovered in recent years. In addition to the threat to consumers'
safety, the costs of recalling all the the defective products from the market followed by the inci-
dences and the damage caused to the business reputation and image have eroded a huge chunk of
the benets by locating production activity in low-wage countries.
The reason for why it is so dicult to ensure product quality in the face of global operation may
attribute to problem of information asymmetry.
This paper aims to study rm's optimal choice of global production modes in the presence of
asymmetric information. In particular, we focus on two types of asymmetric information, namely
hidden characteristics and hidden actions. The former creates adverse selection problem and the
later leads to moral hazard problem, which potentially incur non-trivial costs to multinationals. We
argue that multinationals's choice of dierent global production modes, including greeneld foreign
direct investment, joint venture, and oshore outsourcing, can serve as a means to overcome or
mitigate the costs arising from certain or both types of asymmetric information.
In particular, greeneld FDI keeps the production within rm's boundary and thus avoids ad-
verse selection problem. However, the moral hazard problem still prevails. In contrast, through
oshore joint venture, a foreign rm teams up with a local rm to produce the product and shares
the prots with local joint venture partner. The business mode helps to enhance the interest align-
ment between two entities such that the moral hazard problem can be mitigated. On the other
hand, with the mode of oshore outsourcing, the foreign rm subcontracts the production process
to a third party, whose type and eort level is unobservable and non-veriable. Even though the
foreign rm can design a contract to induce truthful-telling and to deter shirking behavior, the costs
may be very expensive as when the problem of adverse selection is serious.
We study the conditions under which one particular type of oshore production modes is likely
to emerge. The implications generated by the model also help explain the trend and variation of
the prevalence of dierent global business models across industries and countries, and over time.
In particular, we show that in a particular industry, the mode of free-eld FDI prevails in
the host county with low developmental levels while outsourcing mode prevails in the countries
which are relatively more developed. Joint venture modes prevails in the countries with moderate
developmental level. As the industry become more competitive, outsourcing eventually become the
1most protable way of oshoring. The implications are consistent with the ndings by Hummels,
Rapoport and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001), Feenstra and Hanson (2003), Borga and
Zeile (2002), Yeats (2001), Hanson et al. (2001, 2003), among others.
Empirical Motivation
In Figure (1), we utilize use the data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) FDI/TNC Database and show the trend and variation of cross-border merger and
acquisition (CMA) investments as a percentage of FDI in
ows to the host countries over time
and across countries. According to the denition given in the World Investment Report issued by
UNCTAD, FDI in
ow equals the sum of greeneld FDI and cross-border merger acquisition, and
CMA refers to that a foreign rm acquires or merges with an existing local rm, which entails a
change in the control of the merged or acquired rm and involves share-holding in a business entity.
As show in Figure (1), the importance of CMA is higher in the developed countries than that in
developing countries. Moreover, there exhibits a increasing trend over the past two decades between
1987 and 2006.1
With regard to the question as which operation model to adopt when oshoring, the responses
of the CEO's or top managers from the world's largest 1000 companies vary across industries based
on the 2005 FDI Condence Index, an annual survey conducted by the A.T.Kearney, Inc. since
1998. As shown in Figure (2), the business models for moving corporate functions oshore include
captive (greeneld FDI) and joint venture, as well as third-party outsourcing and other non-FDI
options.
Oshoring is not a simple site-provider selection process, particularly when it comes to so-
phisticated and sensitive functions. The concerns over quality control in some business processes,
including R&D, knowledge management and analytic functions, result in the choice of oshoring
operation primarily through greeneld or joint ventures. Nearly 70 percent of future R&D o-
shoring will be through FDI, while less than 20 percent of oshore R&D activity will occur through
outsourcing. When sending information technology, call centers, distribution and logistics oshore,
CEOs prefer to rely on third-party outsourcing contacts. For example, about 55 percent of global
investors plan to work with an outside provider when oshoring their IT functions. Despite the
rapidly growing business process outsourcing (BPO) market, only 28 percent of global investors ex-
1Source: UNCTAD. The simple OLS estimations of the coecients of the time trends for the groups of developed
and developing countries are positive and signicant. The numbers shown in the parentheses are the t-statistics.
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pect to turn to outside service providers to handle functions such as human resources, and nance
and accounting. Nearly 60 percent of investors favor using a captive or joint-venture business model
to handle BPO functions.
2 The Model
We consider a two-country model, in which the North(foreign country) is assumed to have higher
labor cost than the South(domestic country). In an attempt to exploit lower production cost in
the South, a foreign rm with an exclusive blueprint chooses one of the three potential production
modes to produce a given number of nal good in the South, which is normalized to be one.
Three possible oshore production modes are: greeneld foreign direct investment, denoted by (F),
oshore outsourcing, denoted by (O), and joint venture, denoted by (J). In the case of F, the
foreign rm will start up a subsidiary in the domestic country and keeps the production activity in
house. In the case of O, the foreign rm will subcontract the production process to a local rm.
3Figure 2: CEO's Choice of Operation Models when Oshoring
In the case of J, the foreign rm will form a joint venture with a local rm. Production will be
carried out by the new entity, and then two parties will share the prot based on the pre-agreed
prot-sharing rule.
Dierent oshore production modes encounter dierent types of asymmetric information as
summarized in the table shown below and to be elaborated shortly:
Green Field FDI (F) Outsourcing (O) Joint Venture (J)
Hidden Characteristic No Yes Yes
Hidden Action Yes Yes Yes
2.1 Hidden Characteristics
Domestic rm can be either ecient or inecient. Suppose that the ecient type has low marginal
production cost, denoted by c0, and inecient type has high marginal production cost, denoted by
c1, where 0  c0 < c1, and c  c1   c0 > 0: Moreover, the likelihood of randomly meeting an
ecient type equals , where 0    1, and an inecient type is 1   , i.e. Pr(c = c0) = , and
Pr(c = c1) = (1 ). Domestic rm's true type is private information and is not observable by the
foreign rm. Foreign rm only knows the distribution of the eciency level of the domestic rm
regardless of either O or J. In the case of F, foreign rm will transplant its own technology to the
4subsidiary located in the South. The marginal production cost of local subsidiary is denoted cF,
and by assumption, c0  cF < c1.
2.2 Hidden Actions
All type of production modes encounter the problem of hidden information as the foreign rm can
not correctly verify the eort level, denoted by e, exerted by the manager. The manager can choose
the two eort levels, say being diligent, denoted by d or shirking, denoted by s, which consequently
aect the likelihood of producing/delivering high-quality output. Specically, let q 2 fH;Lg denote
the quality of the output, where H and l denote high-and low-quality, respectively. Further more,
let 
e denote the probability of producing high-quality good given the manager's eort level e,
where Pr(q = H j e = d) = 
d, Pr(q = L j e = d) = (1   
d), Pr(q = H j e = s) = 
s,
Pr(q = L j e = s) = (1   
s), 0 < 
s < 
d < 1, 
  
d   
s > 0: Exerting eort incurs cost; in
particular,  i(e = s) = 0,  i(e = d) =  i, where i 2 fF;O;Jg. We assume that  F   O =  J   :
Consumer's willingness to pay to high- and low-quality good is dierent. For a high quality
good, the value to a consumer is aH, and a low-quality good is aL, aL < aH, where aH > aL, i.e.
a  aH   aL > 0. Finally, we assume that both foreign and domestic rms are risk neutral.
Assumption 1 c0 < c1 < As < Ad, and   < A, where Ad  
daH + (1   
d)aL, As  
saH + (1  

s)aL, and A  Ad   As.
Assumption 1 implies that the expected value of the nal output is sucient high such that with
complete information (or in the case of rst best), the foreign rm(principle) prefers production to
shutdown, and prefers diligence to shirking.
3 Greeneld Foreign Direct Investment
We rst explain the time line of case when the foreign rm chooses F. As shown shown in Figure
(3), at t = 0, the foreign rm learns its marginal production cost cF, and oers a take-it-or-leave-it
contract denoted by 
F to a local manager manager. The manager then decides whether to accept
or reject the oer. The project is abandoned if manager rejects the oer; otherwise, manager decides
eort level and produces the agreed amount of output. At the time t = 4, the output is delivered
and the quality of the output is realized. Finally, the pre-agreed contract is honored. As discussed
earlier, foreign rm encounters only the problem of hidden action. To overcome the problem, the
5foreign rm designs and oers a contract contingent on the quality outcome of the product. In
particular, we use 
F = ff(q); q 2 fH;Lgg to denote the contract. If the delivered output is of of
high-quality, the manager receives f(H); otherwise f(L):
































F = ff(q); q = fH;Lg;g
For simplicity, we assume that greeneld FDI does not incur xed costs. We proceed to solve the
optimal contract. Under Assumption 1, we know that the foreign rm aims to induce manager to








df(H) + (1   
d)f(L)   cF    F 

sf(H) + (1   
s)f(L)   cF (1)
IR : 
df(H) + (1   
d)f(L)   cF    F  0 (2)
where, F denotes the foreign rm's expected prot under the mode of F, ICM denotes the incentive
compatibility constraint, which ensures that the manager weakly prefers diligence to shirking, and
IR denotes the individual rationality constraint, which ensures the participation of the manager
6(manager has no incentive to reject the oer). We solve the optimal contract as shown as follows:
























optimal F = [
daH + (1   
d)aL]   [cF +  F] = Ad   [cF +  F]; (3)





s. The detailed proof is provided in the Appendices.
4 Outsourcing
In the case of O, the foreign rms faces both hidden characteristics problem as well we hidden action
problem. The timeline of the case of O is summarized in Figure (4). At time t = 0; Domestic rms'
type is realized based on the deterministic distribution function. The information of each domestic
rm's type c is private information. Foreign rm oers a take-it-or-leave-it contract denoted by 
O
to a randomly met subcontractor. The subcontractor decides whether or not to accept the oer made
by the foreign rm, and chooses a preferred contract in the case when not rejecting. The project is
abandoned if subcontractor rejects the oer; otherwise, the subcontractor decides eort level and
produces output. The output is delivered and the quality of the product is realized, upon which the
pre-agreed contract is honored. The foreign rm can oer a manu of contract to induce the local
subcontract to reveal his true type by choosing a particular contract. This manu of contract is called
the \separating contract," which is denoted by 
O = f(!0(q); q = fH;Lg);(!1(q); q = fH;Lg)g:
In particular, the ecient-type with c = c0 will choose (!0(q); q = fH;Lg), while the inecient-
type with c = c1 will prefer (!1(q); q = fH;Lg): In the case of oering a separating contract,
we also discuss two possible outcomes{one is separating without shutdown, and the other is with
shutdown. In the case of shutdown, the individual rationality constraint for the inecient type is
not satised such that only the ecient type accept the oer. It is possible that the foreign prefers
oering a pooling contract if it is too costly to dierentiate ecient type from inecient type. We
use the 
Op to denote pooling contract. In particular, 
Op = f!(q); q = fH;Lgg.


































4.1 Separating Contract without Shutdown: 




d(aH   !0(H)) + (1   
d)(aL   !0(L))]
+ (1   )[







i!0(H) + (1   




i!1(H) + (1   





i!1(H) + (1   




i!0(H) + (1   




i!0(H) + (1   




i!1(H) + (1   
i)!1(L)   c1    i  0 (7)
ICM
0 : 
d!0(H) + (1   
d)!0(L)   c0     

s!0(H) + (1   
s)!0(L)   c0 (8)
ICM
1 : 
d!1(H) + (1   
d)!1(L)   c1     

s!1(H) + (1   
s)!1(L)   c1 (9)
where, O denotes the foreign rm's expected prot under the mode of O, ICA
i ; i 2 f0;1g denote
the incentive compatibility constraints for both ecient type and inecient type to reveal his true
type, ICM denotes the incentive compatibility constraint, which ensures that the manager weakly
prefers diligence to shirking, and IR denotes the individual rationality constraint, which ensures
8the participation of the manager (manager has no incentive to reject the oer) of both types. We
solve the optimal contract as shown as follows:










optimal O = [
daH + (1   
d)aL]   [c1 +  ] = Ad   [c1 +  ] (10)
The results suggest that separating contract without shutdown does not exist and degenerates
to the pooling contract. The detailed proof is provided in the Appendices.
4.2 Separating Contract with Shutdown: 




d(aH   !0(H)) + (1   






i!0(H) + (1   




i!1(H) + (1   





i!1(H) + (1   




i!0(H) + (1   




i!0(H) + (1   




i!1(H) + (1   
i)!1(L)   c1    i  0 (14)
ICM
0 : 
d!0(H) + (1   
d)!0(L)   c0     

s!0(H) + (1   
s)!0(L)   c0 (15)
The optimization problem is identical to the case of separating contract without shutdown, except,
(1) IR1 does not hold, and (2) ICM
1 is irrelevant. We then solve the optimal contract and the
optimized expected prot as follows:










!1(H) = !1(L) = 0
optimal O =  f[
daH + (1   
d)aL]   [c0 +  ]g =  [Ad   (c0 +  )] (16)
The solution implies that only the ecient subcontractor will accept the oer and choose the contract
(!0(H);!0(L)), and exerts good eort. The detailed proof is provided in the Appendices.
94.3 Pooling Contract: 
Op = f!(q); q = fH;Lgg









d!(H) + (1   
d)!(L)   c0     

s!(H) + (1   
s)!(L)   c0 (17)
ICM
1 : 
d!(H) + (1   
d)!(L)   c1     

s!(H) + (1   
s)!(L)   c1 (18)
IR0 : 
d!(H) + (1   
d)!(L)   c0      0 (19)
IR1 : 
d!(H) + (1   
d)!(L)   c1      0 (20)
where we need only check ICM
i and IRi, where i 2 f0;1g:










optimal Op = [
daH + (1   
d)aL]   [c1 +  ] = Ad   [c1 +  ] = O (21)
The detailed proof is provided in the Appendices.
5 Joint Venture
In the case of joint venture (J), the foreign rm also encounters the problem of hidden characteristics
and hidden action. The dierence between J and O is the formate of contracts available for and
adopted by the foreign rm to overcome the problem. In the case of J, a prot-sharing rule is
oered which make the interest of the manager more align with that of the foreign rm, but can not
be contingent on the quality of the output. The timeline of the joint venture case is summarized
in Figure (5). at time t = 0, local rm's type c is realized, and again it's a private information
and unobservable by the foreign rm. Foreign rm oers a take-it-or-leave-it joint venture contract,
denoted by 
J to domestic rm. Domestic rm decides to accept or reject the oer. The project
is abandoned if domestic rm rejects the oer; otherwise domestic rm decides eort level and
produces output. The output is delivered, quality is realized, and prots are realized, upon which




































and contract is honored and prots are slitted between the foreign rm and local joint venture
partner according to the sharing rule.
In the case of J, there does not exits separating equilibrium since both type of local rms will
choose the contract granting them greater share of prot. In other words, joint venture can not solve
adverse-selection problem. Moreover, to design a optimal prot-sharing rule, the foreign rm faces
a trade-o between inducing diligent-behavior, which leads to greater prots, and smaller share of
the prots. Depending on the distribution of the domestic rms' type and the disutility of being
diligent, the optimal prot sharing rule may not always aim to induce high eort as shown below:
5.1 Prot-sharing Rule (diligence-inducing contract): 
Jd = fg




daH + (1   
d)aL   c0] + (1   )[




0 : (1   )[
daH + (1   
d)aL   c0]     
(1   )[
saH + (1   
s)aL   c0] (22)
ICM
1 : (1   )[
daH + (1   
d)aL   c1]     
(1   )[
saH + (1   
s)aL   c1] (23)
IR0 : (1   )[
daH + (1   
d)aL   c0]      0 (24)
IR1 : (1   )[
daH + (1   
d)aL   c1]      0 (25)
11where Jd denotes the expected prot if the foreign rm oers a contract 
Jd, ICM
i ; i 2 f0;1g
enure both type exert high eort, and IRi; i 2 f0;1g ensure both types of rm accept the oer.
The optimal prot sharing rule is solved as:
d
0 = d
1 = 1  
 
[
daH + (1   
d)aL]   [










daH + (1   
d)aL]   [





daH + (1   







fAd   [c0 + (1   )c1]g (26)
The detailed proof is provided in the Appendices. It is clear from the solution that when high eort
incurs great disutility to the manager, i.e.  is approaching A, it is very costly to oer sucient
incentive. So the foreign rm may consider an alternative, say shirking-inducing, prot-sharing rule:





saH + (1   
s)aL   c0] + (1   )[




0 : (1   )[
saH + (1   
s)aL   c0] 
(1   )[
daH + (1   
d)aL   c0]     (27)
ICM
1 : (1   )[
saH + (1   
s)aL   c1] 
(1   )[
daH + (1   
d)aL   c1]     (28)
IR0 : (1   )[
saH + (1   
s)aL   c0]  0 (29)
IR1 : (1   )[
saH + (1   
s)aL   c1]  0 (30)
where Js denotes the expected prot when oering a contract 
Js, ICM
i ; i 2 f0;1g enure both
type exert low eort, and IRi; i 2 f0;1g ensure both types of rm accept the oer. The optimal




optimal Js = [
saH + (1   
s)aL]   [c0 + (1   )c1] = As   [c0 + (1   )c1] (31)
The detailed proof is provided in the Appendices. The solution suggests that the foreign rm will
keep the full share of the prot, and the local joint venture partner regardless of ecient type or
inecient type will earn zero prot.
126 The Choices of Global Production Mode
Comparing the optimized expected prots functions facing the foreign rm given optimal contract
under dierent oshore production modes, say equations (3), (16), (21), (26), and (31), we are ready
to study the optimal choice of global production mode. In particular, we write the optimized prots
as functions of , which is the likelihood of encountering a high-type domestic rm.
F() = Ad   cF    F (32)
Op() = Ad   c1     (33)
O() = [Ad   c0    ] (34)
Jd() = (1  
 
A
)[Ad   c0   (1   )c1] (35)
Js() = As   c0   (1   )c1 (36)
Notice that in the case of greeneld FDI, these exists no adverse-selection problem, therefore, F()
is a horizontal line. In the case of Op, outsourcing with pooling contract, the foreign rm oers
the same deal to both ecient and inecient types, and thus the expected payment is independent
with , and thus a horizontal line.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, we know Op()  F() 8 2 [0;1]:
We thus only need to compare (32), (34), (35), and (36).









@ ; 8 2 [0;1].
(ii) O(0) < minfJd(0); Js(0)g < maxfJd(0); Js(0)g < F(0):







O , and 
Jd








O ) = Js(Js
O ), O(
Jd




Js ) = Js(
Jd








A(c1   cF    F) + (Ad   c1) 
(c1   c0)(A    )
F
O =
Ad   cF    F








(A    )(Ad   c1)




A2   (Ad   c1) 
(c1   c0) 
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 1, if c0 +   < cF +  F, we know F
Js < F
O:
Proposition 1 Dene ^   and   , such that:

Jd
O ( ^  ) = 
Jd
Js ( ^  ); and F
Jd(   ) = F
Js(   ): (37)
Given c0 +   < cF +  F,
(i) if   < ^  ; for  2 [0; F
Jd), F is the dominant strategy; for  2 [F
Jd; 
Jd
O ), Jd is dominant
strategy; and for  2 (
Jd
O ;1], O is the dominate strategy, as shown as Case A in Figure (6)
(ii) if ^   <   <   , for  2 [0; F
Jd), F is the dominant strategy; for  2 [F
Jd; 
Jd
Js ), Jd is dominant
strategy; for  2 [
Jd
Js ; Js
O ), Js is dominant strategy; and for  2 (Js
O ;1], O is the dominate
strategy as shown as Case B in Figure (6).
(iii) if    <  , for  2 [0; F
Js), F is the dominant strategy; for  2 [F
Js; Js
O ), Js is dominant
strategy; and for  2 (Js
O ;1], O is the dominate strategy as shown as Case C in Figure (6).
Proposition 2(Case D) If cF +  F < c0 +  , maxfJd();Js();O()g < F() 8 2 [0;1]:
Greeneld FDI is the dominate global production mode for any  2 [0;1]. (See Appendices for
Proof.)
c0 +   < cF +  F cF +  F < c0 +  
  < ^   Case A: F and Jd and O Case D: F
^   <   <    Case B: F, Jd, Js, and O Case D: F
   <   Case C: F, Js, and O Case D: F
147 Conclusions
The importance of asymmetric information in the decision making of multinational rms deserves
more careful study as suggested by recent high prole incidences related to bad quality control
arising from oshoring. This paper untangles two distinct aspects of information asymmetry, namely
hidden characteristics and hidden actions, and analyzes how dierent oshoring modes can serve as
means to overcome or mitigate the information asymmetry problem. The implications generated
by the model are reich enough to reconcile the patterns of the prevalence of oshoring modes across
countries, industries, and over time.
15Appendices
Optimal Contract under the FDI Arrangement
There exists an optimal contract 
F = ff(q)g;q = H;L; which maximizes the foreign rm's
expected prot and makes the manager's IR and ICM constraints binding as explained below:
 (2) must be binding. If not, 
df(H)+(1 
d)f(L) cF   F > 0 , the foreign rm (principal)
then can reduce f(L) to make it binding without aecting the inequality of (1) since 
d > 
s.
 Since (2) is binding, F = Ad  cF  F which makes the binding condition of (1) irrelevant.
For simplicity, we assume (1) binding to solve the optimal contract.
Solving (1) and (2) with equalities, we can obtain 
F = ff(q)g;q = H;L as










optimal F = Ad   [cF +  F]
Optimal Separating Contract without Shutdown under the Outsourcing Arrangement
There exists an optimal contract 
O = f(!0(q));(!1(q))g;q 2 fH;Lg which maximizes the
foreign rm's expected prot and makes the manager's ICA
0 , ICM
0 , ICM
1 and IR1 constraints
binding as explained below:
 Given (8) and (9), we can simplify (4), (5), (6) and (7) as

d!0(H) + (1   
d)!0(L)   c0     

d!1(H) + (1   
d)!1(L)   c0     (38)

d!1(H) + (1   
d)!1(L)   c1     

d!0(H) + (1   
d)!0(L)   c1     (39)

d!0(H) + (1   
d)!0(L)   c0      0 (40)

d!1(H) + (1   
d)!1(L)   c1      0 (41)
 (38) and (39) implies that the two conditions should be binding simultaneously and one of
which is redundant, say (39).
16 (38) and (41) imply (40), hence (40) is redundant.
 we than prove that (41) must be binding. If not, 
d!1(H) + (1   
d)!1(L)   c1     > 0,
the principal/foreign rm can reduce !0(L) and !1(L) with !0(L) = !1(L) to lower
rewards/payments to the subcontractor until it is binding but still ensure (38) and (39) hold.
 (38) must be binding since (41) is binding (). If not, 
d!0(H) + (1   
d)!0(L) > (c1 +  ) ,
then the foreign rm can reduce !0(L) until it is binding without violating the conditions of
(41).
 If (12) is binding, no matter whether (6) is binding or not, O would not be aected.
Therefore, we can make (6) binding to nd out one of the contracts.
 If (38) and (41) are binding, no matter whether (8) and (9) are binding or not, O is
determined. For simplicity, we assume them to be binding to solve the optimal contract.
Solving (8), (9), (38), and (41) with equalities, we can obtain 
O = f(!0(q));(!1(q))g;q = H;L.
as:










optimal O = Ad   [c1 +  ]
Optimal Separating Contract with Shutdown under the Outsourcing Arrangement
There exists an optimal contract 
O = f(!0(q));(!1(q) = 0)g;q 2 fH;Lg, which maximizes
the principal's expected prot and makes the subcontractor's ICA
0 and ICM
0 constraints binding as
explained below:
 We can let !1(q) = 0 to shutdown the inecient subcontractor.
 Given !1(q) = 0, and (15), (14) is redundant and we can simplify (11), (12), and (13) as:

d!0(H) + (1   
d)!0(L)   c0      0 (42)
0  
d!0(H) + (1   
d)!0(L)   c1     (43)

d!0(H) + (1   
d)!0(L)   c0      0 (44)
 (44) is redundant since (42) and (44) are identical.
17 (42) must be binding. If not, 
d!0(H) + (1   
d)!0(L)   c0     > 0 , the foreign rm can
reduce !0(L) to make it binding without violating (15) and (43).
 (43) must be satised since (42) is binding and 0  (c0   c1). Therefore, (43) is redundant.
 Given (42) is binding, no matter whether (15) is binding or not, O would not be aected.
Therefore, for simplicity, we let (15) binding to solve the contracts
Solving (15) and (42) with equalities, we can obtain 
O = f(!0(q));(!1(q) = 0)g;q 2 fH;Lg
as:










!1(H) = !1(L) = 0
optimal O =  fAd   [c0 +  ]g
Optimal Pooling Contract under the Outsourcing Arrangement
There exists an optimal contact 
Op = f!(q)g;q 2 f= H;Lg, which maximizes the foreign
rm's expected prot and makes the subcontractor's ICM
0 and IR1 constraints binding as explained
below:
 (17) is redundant since (17) and (18) are identical.
 Since c1 > c0, (20) implies (19), hence (19) is redundant.
 (20) must be binding. If not, 
d!(H) + (1   
d)!(L)   c1     > 0 , foreign rm can re-
duce !(H) and !(L) with !(H) = !(L) to make it binding without aecting the inequality
of (17).
 Since (20) is binding, no matter whether (17) is binding or not, O would not be aected.
Therefore, for simplicity, we let it be binding to solve the contract.
Solving (20) and (17)(24) with equalities, we can obtain 
Op = f!(q)g;q 2 fH;Lg as










optimal Op = Ad   [c1 +  ]
18Optimal Diligence-inducing, Prot-sharing Contract under the Joint Venture Arrange-
ment
There exists an optimal contract 
Jd = f()g, which maximizes the principal's expected prot
and makes the joint venture partner's ICM
0 constraint binding as explained below:
 (22) and (23) are identical. We let (23) be redundant.
 (25) implies (24), hence (24) is redundant.
 (22) and Assumption 1 imply (25), hence (25) is redundant.
 (22) must be binding. If not, (1 )[
daH+(1 
d)aL c0]   > (1 )[
saH+(1 
s)aL c0].
The foreign rm can increase  to make it binding.
Solving (22) with equality, we can obtain 
Jd = f()g as:
d = 1  
 
[
daH + (1   
d)aL]   [











fAd   [c0 + (1   )c1]g (45)
Optimal Shirking-inducing Prot-sharing Contract under the Joint Venture Arrange-
ment
There exists an optimal contract 
Js = f()g, which maximizes the principal's expected prots
and makes domestic rm's IR1 constraint binding as explained below:
 (27) and (28) are identical. We let (28) be redundant.
 Since c1 > c0, (30) implies (29), and (29) is redundant.
 (30) must be binding. If not (1   )[
saH + (1   
s)aL   c1] > 0. The foreign rm can
increase  to make it binding without violating (27).
 Since (30) is binding,  = 1 and 0     under Assumption 1. Therefore (27) must be
satised, and is redundant
We can solve optimal Js as:
s = 1
optimal Js = [
saH + (1   
s)aL]   [c0 + (1   )c1]
s = 1
optimal Js = As   [c0 + (1   )c1]















= (c1   c0)
@O()
@
= (Ad   c0   )
Proof of Lemma 2 (ii)
F(0) = Ad   cF     > 0
Jd(0) = (1  
 
A
)(Ad   c1) > 0
Js(0) = As   c1 > 0
O(0) = 0
F(0)   Jd(0) = (c1   cF) + (
As   c1
A
)   0
F(0)   Js(0) = (c1   cF) + (A    )  0










Proof of Lemma 2 (iii)
O(1) = Ad   c0     > 0
Jd(1) = (1  
 
A
)(Ad   c0) > 0
Js(1) = As   c0 > 0
O(1)   Jd(1) =
 
A
(As   c0)  0
O(1)   Js(1) = A      0
Proof of Proposition 2
F(1) = Ad   cF    
O(1) = Ad   c0    
Since cF + F < c0 + , we know O(1) < F(1). According to Lemma 2, maxfJd(1); Js(1)g <
O(1) < F(1), and maxfJd(0); Js(0); O(0)g < F(0): Since Jd(1), Js(), O(), and
20F() are continues and weakly increasing function, we prove that maxfJd();Js();O()g <
F() 8 2 [0;1]:
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